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Abstract. The free energy principle in the neurosciences stipulates that all viable
agents embody and minimize informational free energy to fit their environmental niche.
We implement free energy minimization in a more physically principled manner by
effectively casting it to Bayesian control dynamics. Specifically, we build a continuous-
state formulation that prescribes the brain’s computation for actively inferring the
causes of sensory inputs, based on the principle of least action. For this, we consider
that the motor signal arises from the residual errors in the cognitive expectation
about the nonstationary sensory inputs at the proprioceptive level. Consequently, we
derive the effective Hamilton equations that determine the optimal trajectories in the
perceptual phase space, which minimize the sensory uncertainty. We also demonstrate
their utility using a simple model with biological relevance to sensorimotor regulation
processes such as motor reflex arcs or saccadic eye movement.
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1. Introduction
The free energy principle (FEP) in the field of neurosciences rationalizes that all viable
organisms cognize and behave in the natural world by calling forth the probabilistic
models embodied in their neural system — the brain — in a manner that ensures
their adaptive fitness (Friston 2010a). The neurobiological mechanism that endows an
organism’s brain — the neural observer — with this ability is theoretically framed into
an inequality that weighs two information-theoretical measures, namely, the surprisal
and the informational free energy (IFE) (Buckley and Kim et al. 2017). The surprisal
provides a measure of the atypicality of an environmental niche, and the IFE is the
upper bound of the surprisal. The inequality enables a cognitive agent to indirectly
minimize the IFE as a variational objective function instead of the intractable surprisal.
The minimization corresponds to inferring the external causes of afferent sensory data,
encoded as a probability density at the sensory interface, e.g., sensory organs. An
organism’s brain neurophysically performs the Bayesian computation of minimizing the
induced IFE. This is termed as recognition dynamics (RD), which emulates — under the
Laplace approximation (Buckley and Kim et al. 2017) — the predictive coding scheme
of message processing or recognition (Rao and Ballard 1999).
The neurobiological mechanisms of the abductive inference of the physical brain are
not yet understood; therefore, researchers mostly rely on information-theoretic concepts
(Elfwing 2016; Ramstead et al. 2019; Kuzma 2019; Shimazaki 2019; Kiefer 2020, Sanders
et al. 2020). The FEP facilitates dynamic causal models in the brain’s generalized-state
space (Friston 2008b; Friston et al. 2010), which pose a mixed discrete-continuous
Bayesian filtering (Jazwinski 1970); Balaji and Friston 2011). In the present work,
we consider that the brain confronts the continuous influx of stochastic sensations and
conducts the Bayesian inversion of inferring external causes in the continuous state
representations. Biological phenomena are naturally continuous spatiotemporal events;
accordingly, we suggest that the continuous-state approaches that are used to describe
cognition and behavior are better suited than discrete-state descriptions for studying
the perceptual computation in the brain. Despite its explanatory power as a unified
biological principle (Friston 2013; Isomura et al. 2015; Bogacz2017; Colombo and
Wright 2018), the conventional FEP assumes several extra-theoretical facets that require
evaluation. The specific issues that have drawn our attention are i) the non-Newtonian
extension of dynamical states in the generalized state space and ii) the heuristic gradient-
descent implementation of minimization on the instantaneous IFE landscape.
Recently, we carefully evaluated the FEP while clarifying the technical assumptions
that underlie the continuous state-space formulation of the FEP Buckley and Kim et
al. 2017). A full account of the discrete-state formulation, which is complementary to
our formulation, can be found in (Da Costa 2020). In a subsequent study (Kim 2018),
we clarified some technical facets in its conventional formalism, which necessitated a
reformulation of the working hypotheses described above. In doing so, we postulated
that “surprisal” plays the role of a Lagrangian in theoretical mechanics (Landau and
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Lifshitz 1976; Sengupta et al. 2016), and we worked out a plausible computational
implementation of the FEP by utilizing the principle of least action. Our tenet was
that, although the FEP relies on the Bayesian abductive logic, it must be properly
formulated and conditioned on the physical principles and laws governing the matter
comprising the brain. To this end, we proposed that any process theory of the FEP
ought to be based on the full implication of the inequality (Kim 2018)ż
dt t´ ln ppϕqu ď
ż
dtF rqpϑq, ppϕ, ϑqs, (1)
where ϕ and ϑ collectively denote the sensory inputs and their environmental causes,
respectively. The integrand on the left-hand side (LHS) of the preceding equation
´ ln ppϕq is the aforementioned surprisal, which measures the “self-information”
contained in the sensory density ppϕq (Cover 2006), and F on the right-hand side (RHS)
is the variational IFE defined as
F rqpϑq, ppϕ, ϑqs ”
ż
dϑqpϑq ln qpϑq
ppϕ, ϑq , (2)
which encapsulates the recognition (R-) density qpϑq and the generative (G-) density
ppϑ, ϕq (see Buckley and Kim et al. 2017). While the G-density is the brain’s prior
belief about the environmental dynamics and sensory generation, the R-density is the
brain’s current guess of the environmental cause of the sensory perturbation. They
induce variational IFE when receptors at the brain-environment interface are excited by
sensory perturbations, and the induced variational IFE is encoded by the brain variables
such as the action potential, synaptic plasticity, or brain waves.
According to Eq. (1), the FEP articulates that the brain minimizes the upper
bound of the sensory uncertainty, which is a long-term averaged surprisal and not
an instant one. We identify this bound as an informational action (IA) within the
scope of the mechanical principle of least action (Landau and Lifshitz 1976). Then,
by complying with the revised FEP, we derive the RD without invoking gradient-
descent schemes. The RD neurophysically performs the computation for minimizing
the IA when the neural observer encounters continuous streams of sensory data. The
advantage of our formulation is that the brain and the environmental states are specified
by using only bare continuous variables and their first-order derivatives (velocities or
equivalent momenta), thereby absolving the need for the aforementioned non-Newtonian
assumptions. The momentum variables represent the prediction errors, which quantify
the discrepancy between an observed input and its top-down belief of a cognitive agent in
the predictive coding language (Huang and Rao 2011; de Gardelle et al. 2013; Kozunov
et al. 2020). In the present study, we continue our effort to make the FEP a more
physically principled formalism.
The goal of this work is to extend our previous study to include the agent’s motor
control, which acts on the environment to alter sensory inputs.; Previously, by utilizing
; In this work, we use the term control, instead of the frequently used term “action” to mean the
motion of a living agent’s effectors (muscles) acting on the environment. This is done to avoid any
confusion with the term action appearing in the nomenclature of “the principle of least action”.
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the principle of least action, we focused on the formulation of perceptual dynamics
for the passive inference of static sensory inputs (Kim 2018), without incorporating
motor control for the active perception of nonstationary sensory streams. Here, we
apply our approach to the problem of active inference derived from the FEP (Friston
et al. 2009; Friston et al. 2010c; Friston et al. 2011a), which proposes that organisms
can minimize the IFE further by altering sensory observations when the outcome of
perceptual inference alone is not in accordance with an internal representation of the
environment (Buckley and Kim et al. 2017). It is suggested that living systems are
endowed with the ability to adjust their sensations via proprioceptive feedback, which
is attributed to an inherited trait of all motile animals embodied in the reflex pathways
(Tuthill and Azim 2018). In this respect, motor control is considered as an inference
of the causes of motor signals that are encoded as prediction errors at proprioceptors,
and motor inference is realized at the spinal level by classical reflex arcs (Friston 2011b;
Adams et al. 2013). Our formulation evinces that the ensuing RD encompasses motor
signals as a time-dependent source, thereby describing active inference as an extension
of the optimal control theory embedding Bayesian logic (Friston 2011b; Baltieri and
Buckley 2019). Another notable feature of our work is that it considers the correlation
between the causal states and the sensory-data measurement, which results in significant
modulation in the perceptual and motor-control outcomes.
Technically, a functional variation of the IA yields the RD that computes the
Bayesian inversion, which is given as a set of coupled differential equations for the
brain variables and their conjugate momenta. The brain variables are ascribed to the
brain’s representation of the environmental states, and their conjugate momenta are the
combined prediction errors of the sensory data and the rate of the state representations.
The neural computation of active inference corresponds to integrating the RD and is
subject to nonautonomous motor signals. Its solution results in optimal trajectories
in the perceptual state space, which minimizes the accumulation of the IFE over
continuous time, i.e., the IA. In our formulation, both descending predictions and
ascending prediction errors constitute the dynamical states governed by the closed-loop
RD in the functional hierarchy of the brain’s sensorimotor system. This feature is in
contrast to the conventional implementation of the FEP, which considers the backward
prediction — belief propagation — as neural dynamics and the forward prediction error
as an instant message passing without any causal dynamics (Friston 2010a; Buckley and
Kim et al. 2017).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we provide a compact
overview of our recent efforts in finessing the technical subtleties of the standard FEP
theory. In Sect. 3, we formulate the Bayesian mechanics of the sensorimotor cycle by
utilizing the principle of least action. Then, in Sect. 4, we present a parsimonious model
for a concrete manifestation of our formulation. Finally, in Sect. 5, we provide the
concluding remarks.
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2. Outline of technical developments
Below, we recapitulate the significant developments from our continuous-state
formulation, while discussing the technical features that distinguish our theory from
the conventional state-space implementation of the FEP.
2.1. Obviating the need for generalized states
The Bayesian filtering formalism of the FEP adopts the concept of generalized motion
of a physical object by defining its mechanical state beyond position and velocity
(momentum). The introduction of this theoretical construct is argued to provide a more
detailed specification of the dynamical states (Friston 2008a; Friston 2008b; Friston et
al. 2010b). The mechanical states are generalized by recursively taking higher-order
derivatives of the bare states. A point in hyperspace defined by the generalized states is
interpreted as an instantaneous trajectory. This notion provides an essential theoretical
basis for ensuring an equilibrium solution of the RD in the conventional formulation of
the FEP (Kim 2018), and it is commonly employed by researchers (Parr and Friston
2018; Baltieri and Buckley 2019). However, the non-Newtonian construct has subtleties
in assigning physical observables to higher-order motions. Standard physics does not
consider jerk (third order) as a cause of the changing acceleration (second order), snap
(fourth order) as a cause of the changing jerk, or the continued generalization. Instead,
only the position (zeroth order) and velocity (first order) are adopted as the two required
dynamical observables (Landau and Lifshitz 1976). Our formulation avoids invoking the
generalized states and follows the normative rules (Kim 2018); however, it still provides
a natural way to determine the equilibrium solutions for the RD. Besides, it can also
handle temporal correlation, which is another justification for the conventional use of
the generalized states (see Sect. 2.3).
2.2. Replacing gradient descent implementation by the Hamiltonian mechanics
The conventional FEP employs the gradient descent method in the optimal theory to
minimize the variational IFE, i.e., the upper bound on the surprisal. To incorporate
the time-varying feature of the sensory inputs, it further adopts an adroit procedure of
technically distinguishing the path of a mode and the mode of a path in the generalized
state space (Friston 2008b; Friston et al. 2010b). This extra-theoretical construct
considers the nonequilibrium dynamics of the generalized brain states as drift-diffusion
flows that locally conserve the probability density in the hyperspace of the generalized
states. In the revised formulation, we replace the gradient descent scheme with the
standard mechanical formulation of the least action principle (Kim 2018). The resulting
novel RD entails optimal trajectories but no single fixed points in the canonical state
(phase) space, which provides an estimate of the minimum sensory uncertainty, i.e.,
the average surprisal over a finite temporal horizon. The phase space comprises the
positions (predictions) and momenta (prediction errors) of the brain’s representations
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of the causal environment. A recent study has indicated the necessity of exercising
caution when applying gradient descent to a dynamical optimization of the objective
functions in brain theory (Surace et al. 2020).
2.3. Treatment of noise correlations
The FEP requires the brain’s internal model of the G-density ppϕ, ϑq with the likelihood
ppϕ|ϑq and prior ppϑq in a top-down manner. The likelihood density is determined by
the random fluctuation in the expected sensory-data generation, and the prior density
is determined by that in the believed environmental dynamics. The brain encounters
continuous sensory signals on a fast timescale, often shorter than the correlation
time of the random processes (Friston 2008a); accordingly, in general, the noises
embrace a non-Markovian stochastic process with an intrinsic temporal correlation that
surmounts the ideal white-noise stochasticity. It is argued that the noises are analytic
(i.e., differentiable) to allow correlation between the distinct dynamical orders of the
continuous states (Friston 2008b; Friston et al. 2010b). In practice, to furnish a closed
dynamics for a finite number of variables, the recursive equations of motion for the
continued generalized states need to be truncated at an arbitrary order by hand. The
Wiener processes with a delta-correlated (white) noise are mathematically singular;
they need to be smoothed to describe fast biophysical processes. However, without
resorting to the generalized states, the non-Markovian processes with colored noises
can be considered within conventional stochastic theories (van Kampen:1981; Fox 1987;
Risken 1989; Moon and Wettlaufer 2014). Besides, the rules of ordinary physics for a
continuous motion presume the position and its first-order derivative (velocity) to be
statistically uncorrelated observables at a microscopic level.
2.4. Closure of the sensorimotor loop in active inference
The conventional FEP facilitates gradient descent minimization for the mechanistic
implementation of active inference, which makes the motor-control dynamics available
in the brain’s RD (Friston et al. 2009; Friston et al. 2010c; Friston et al. 2011a). The
gradient-descent scheme is mathematically expressed as
9a “ ´∇aF Ñ ´BFBϕ
dϕ
da
, (3)
where a denotes an agent’s motor variable, and F is the Laplace-encoded IFE by the
biophysical brain variables (see Buckley and Kim et al. 2017). An agent’s capability
of subjecting sensory inputs to motor control is considered as a functional dependence
ϕ “ ϕpaq in the environmental generative processes (Friston et al. 2009). According to
Eq. (3), an agent performs the minimization by effectuating the sensory data dϕ{da
and obtains the best result for motor inference when 9a “ 0, where the condition
BF {Bϕ “ 0 must be met. Because BF {Bϕ produces terms proportional to the sensory
prediction errors, the fulfillment of motor inference is equivalent to suppressing the
proprioceptive errors. Thus, the motor control tries to minimize the prediction errors,
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while the prediction errors convey motor signals for the control dynamics; this forms
a sensorimotor loop. Some subtle questions arise here about the dynamical status of
the motor-control variable a: Equation (3) evidently handles a as a dynamical state;
however, the corresponding equation of motion governing its dynamics is not given in
the environmental processes. Instead, the mechanism of motor control that vicariously
alters the sensory-data generation is presumed (Friston et al. 2009). In addition,
motor variables are represented as the active states of the brain, e.g., motor-neuron
activities in the ventral horn of the spinal cord (Friston et al. 2010c); however, they
are treated differently from other hidden-state representations. Recall that the internal
state representations are expressed as generalized states, whereas the active states are
not.
In the following, we formulate a semi-active inference problem, which does not
explicitly address motor planning in the RD but encompasses motor control as a time-
dependent driving term. Our theory does not employ the theoretical construct of the
generalized states and evades the gradient descent implementation of the active state
dynamics. We also consider the correlation between the environmental dynamics and
the generative process of sensory inputs. We regard the environmental states and the
sensory variables as fluctuating, coarse-grained hydrodynamic fields, not dynamically
independent microscopic states.
3. Closed-loop dynamics of perception and motion
The brain is not divided into sensory and motor systems. Instead, it is one inference
machine that performs the closed-loop dynamics of perception and motor control. Here,
we develop a framework of active inference within the scope of the least action principle
by employing the Laplace-encoded IFE as an informational Lagrangian.
The environmental states ϑ undergo deterministic or stochastic dynamics by
obeying physical laws and principles. Here, we do not explicitly consider their equations
of motion because they are hidden from the brain’s perspective, i.e., the brain as a
neural observer does not possess direct epistemic access. Similarly, the sensory data ϕ
are physically generated by an externally hidden process at a sensory receptor, which
constitutes the brain-environment interface. However, to emphasize the effect of an
agent’s motor control a on sensory generation, we facilitate the generative process of
sensory data, as usual, by an instantaneous mapping
ϕ “ hpϑ, aq ` zgp, (4)
where hpϑ, aq is the linear or nonlinear map of the input generation, and zgp is the
noise involved. Note that an agent’s motor-control a is explicitly included in the
generative map. However, the neural observer does not know how the sensory streams
are effectuated by the agent’s motion in the environment (Friston et al. 2010c).
The FEP circumvents this epistemic difficulty by hypothesizing a formal homology
between the external physical processes and the corresponding internal models foreseen
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by the neural observer (Friston et al. 2010c). Upon receiving sensory-data influx, the
brain launches the R-density qpϑq to infer the external causes via variational Bayes.
The R-density is the probabilistic representation of the environment, whose sufficient
statistics are assumed to be encoded by neurophysical brain variables, e.g., neuronal
activity or synaptic efficacy. When a fixed-form Gaussian density is taken for the
R-density, which is called the Laplace approximation, only the first-order sufficient
statistic, i.e., the mean µ is needed to specify the IFE effectively (Buckley and Kim et
al. 2017). The brain continually updates the R-density by using its internal dynamics,
which is described here as a Langevin-type equation
dµ
dt
“ fpµq ` w, (5)
where fpµq represents the brain’s belief about the external dynamics encoded by a
neurophysical driving mechanism of the brain variables µ, and w is random noise. The
sensory perturbations at the receptors are predicted by the neural observer via the
instantaneous mapping
ϕpaq “ gpµq ` z, (6)
where the belief gpµq is encoded by the internal variables, and z is the associated noise.
Our sensory generative model provides a mechanism for sampling the sensory data ϕ by
using the brain’s active states a, which represent an external motor control embedded in
Eq. (4). Note that Eq. (4) describes the environmental processes that generate sensory
inputs ϕ, while its homolog ’Eq. (6)’ prescribes the brains’ prior belief about ϕ that
can be altered by the active states a. The instantaneous state of the brain µ, which
is specified by Eq. (5), picks out a particular R-density qpϑq when the brain seeks the
true posterior (the goal of perceptual inference). The motor control fulfills the prior
expectations by modifying the sensory generation via active-state effectuation at the
proprioceptors.
Through Laplace approximation (Buckley and Kim et al. 2017), the G-density
ppϕ, ϑq is encoded in the brain as p “ ppϕ, µq, where the sensory stimuli ϕ are predicted
by the neural observer µ via Eq. (6). Here, we argue that the physical sensory-recording
process is conditionally independent of the brain’s internal dynamics; however, the brain
states must be neurophysically involved in computing the sensory prediction. In other
words, the sensory perturbation ϕ at the interface is a source for exciting the neuronal
activity µ. This observation renders the set of Eqs. (5) and (6) to be dynamically
coupled, not conditionally independent. We incorporate this conditional dependence
into our formulation by introducing a correlation between the noises w and z.
For simplicity, we consider the stationary Gaussian processes for the bivariate
variable Z as a column vector
Z ”
˜
w
z
¸
,
Bayesian mechanics of perceptual inference and motor control in the brain 9
where w “ 9µ ´ fpµq and z “ ϕ ´ gpµq, and specify the Laplace-encoded G-density
ppϕ, µq as
ppϕ, µq “ 1ap2piq2|Σ| exp
ˆ
´1
2
ZTΣ´1Z
˙
, (7)
where ZT is the transpose of Z. The covariance matrix Σ for the above is given as
Σ “
˜
σw φptq
φptq σz
¸
,
where the stationary variances σi (i “ w, z) and the transient covariance φ are defined,
respectively, as
σwp0q “ xw2y, σzp0q “ xz2y, and φptq “ xwp0qzptqy.
With the prescribed internal model of the brain for the G-density, the Laplace-encoded
IFE can be specified as F pϕ, µq “ ´ ln ppϕ, µq (for details, see Buckley and Kim et al.
2017). Then, it follows that
F pϕ, µ; tq “ 1
2
mw p 9µ´ fpµqq2 ` 1
2
mz pϕ´ gpµqq2 (8)
´ ?mwmzρ p 9µ´ fpµqq pϕ´ gpµqq ` 1
2
ln
`
2pip1´ ρ2qσwσz
˘
,
where ρ is the correlation function defined as a normalized covariance
ρ ” φ?
σwσz
. (9)
We also introduce the notations mi pi “ w, zq as
mi ” 1
σip1´ ρ2q , (10)
which are precisions, scaled by the correlation, in the conventional FEP.
Next, as we proposed in (Kim 2018), we identify F as an informational Lagrangian
L in the scope of the principle of least action, and define
L ” 1
2
mw p 9µ´ fqq2 ` 1
2
mz pϕ´ gqq2 ´?mwmzρ p 9µ´ fq pϕ´ gq , (11)
which is viewed as a function of µ and 9µ for the given sensory inputs ϕptq, i.e.,
L “ Lpµ, 9µ;ϕq. Note that we dropped the last term in Eq. (8) when translating F
into L because it can be expressed as a total time-derivative term that does not affect
the resulting equations of motion (Landau and Lifshitz 1976). Then, the theoretical
action S that effectuates the variational objective functional under the revised FEP is
set up as
Srµptqs “
ż
F pµptq, 9µptq;ϕqdt. (12)
The Lagrange equation of motion, which determine the trajectory µ “ µptq for a given
initial condition µp0q, is derived by minimizing the action δS ” 0.
Equivalently, the equations of motion can be considered in terms of the position µ
and its conjugate momentum p, instead of the position µ and velocity 9µ. We have used
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the terms position and velocity as a metaphor to indicate the dynamical variables µ and
9µ, respectively. For this, we need to convert the Lagrangian L into the Hamiltonian H
by performing a Legendre transformation
Hpµ, pq “ p 9µ´ Lpµ, 9µq,
where p is the canonical momentum conjugate to µ, which is calculated from L as
p “ BLB 9µ “ mw p 9µ´ fq ´
?
mwmzpϕ´ gqρ. (13)
After some manipulation, the functional form of H can be obtained explicitly as follows
Hpµ, p;ϕq “ T pµ, p;ϕq ` V pµ;ϕq, (14)
where we have indicated its dependence on the sensory influx ϕ. In addition, the terms
T and V on the RHS are defined as
T pµ, p;ϕptqq ” p
2
2mw
`
ˆ
ρ
c
mz
mw
´
ϕ´ gpµq
¯
` fpµq
˙
p, (15)
V pµ;ϕptqq ” 1
2
mz
`
1´ ρ2˘ ´ϕ´ gpµq¯2. (16)
Here, T and V represent the kinetic and potential energies, respectively, which define
the informational Hamiltonian of the brain. Similarly, mw and mz represent the neural
inertial masses, again as a metaphor. Unlike that in standard mechanics, the second
term in the expression for kinetic energy is dependent on the linear momentum and
position.
Next, we generate the Hamilton equations of motion, which are equivalent to the
Lagrange equation, by carrying out
9µ “ BHBp and 9p “ ´
BH
Bµ .
As described below, the Hamilton equations are better suited for our purposes, since
they specify the RD as coupled first-order differential equations of the brain state µ
and its conjugate momentum p. In contrast, the Lagrange equation is a second-order
differential equation of the state variable (Landau and Lifshitz 1976). The results are
as follows:
9µ “ 1
mw
p ` fpµq ` α∆ϕ, (17)
9p “ ´
ˆBf
Bµ ´ β
Bg
Bµ
˙
p´ `1´ γ2˘ BgBµ∆ϕ, (18)
where the parameters α, β, and γ have been respectively defined for notational
convenience as
α ” ρ{?mzmw, β ” ρ
a
mz{mw, and γ ” ρ
a
mw{mz. (19)
In Eqs. (17) and (18), we have also defined the notation ∆ϕ as
∆ϕpµ; tq ” mzpϕpaq ´ gpµqq. (20)
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It measures the discrepancy between the adjustable sensory input ϕ by an agent’s motor
control a and the top-down neural prediction gpµq, weighted by the neural inertial mass
mz.
Below, we appraise the Bayesian mechanics prescribed by Eqs. (17) and (18) and
note some significant aspects:
(i) The derived RD suggests that both the brain activities µ and their conjugate
momenta p are dynamic variables. The instantaneous values of µ and p correspond
to a point in the brain’s perceptual state space, and the continuous solution over a
temporal horizon forms an optimal trajectory that minimizes the theoretical action,
which represents the sensory uncertainty.
(ii) The canonical momentum p defined in Eq. (13) can be rewritten as p “ mw p 9µ´ fq´
ρ
a
mw{mz∆ϕ. Accordingly, when the normalized correlation ρ is nonvanishing, the
momentum quantifies the combined errors in predicting the changing states and the
sensory stimuli. The prediction errors propagate through the brain by obeying the
coupled dynamics according to Eqs. (17) and (18).
(iii) The terms involving the time-dependent ∆ϕ in Eqs. (17) and (18) are identified as
the driving forces Ci, i “ µ, p,
Cµ ” α∆ϕ, (21)
Cp ” ´BVBµ “ ´
`
1´ γ2˘ BgBµ∆ϕ. (22)
The sensory prediction error ∆ϕ, defined in Eq. (20), quantifies the motor signals
engaging with the brain’s nervous control in integrating the RD.
Equations (17) and (18) are the highlights of our formulation, which prescribes the
brain’s Bayesian mechanics of actively inferring the external causes of sensory inputs
under the revised FEP. Note that the motor variable a is not explicitly included in our
derived RD; instead, it implicitly induces nonautonomous sensory inputs ϕptq in the
motor signal ∆ϕ. The motor signal appears as a time-dependent driving term, which
makes the RDmore akin to the motor-control dynamics. The driving forces are primarily
induced by the discrepancy between the sensory streams ϕptq and those predicted by the
brain. The neural observer continuously integrates the RD subject to a motor signal
to perform the sensory-uncertainty minimization, thereby closing the perception and
motion control within a reflex arc. When we neglect the correlation ρ between the
sensory perturbation and the neuronal response to it, we can recover the RD that was
reported in the previous publication (Kim 2018), which demonstrates the consistency
of our formulation. The full implication of our formulation in the hierarchical brain can
be straightforwardly made as done in (Kim 2018), which admits the bidirectional facet
in information flow of descending predictions and ascending prediction errors (Markov
and Kennedy 2013; Michalareas et al. 2016).
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4. Simple Bayesian-agent model: an implicit motor control
In this section, we numerically demonstrate the utility of our formulation using an
agent-based model, which is based on an early publication (Buckley and Kim et al.
2017). Unlike that in the previous study, the current model does not employ generalized
states and their motions; instead, the RD is specified using only the position µ and its
conjugate momentum p for a given sensory input ϕptq. The environmental objects
invoking an agent’s sensations can be either static or time-dependent, and in turn, the
time dependence can also be either stationary (not moving on average) or nonstationary.
According to the framework of active inference, the inference of static properties
corresponds to passive perception without motor control a. Meanwhile, the inference of
time-varying properties renders an agent’s active perception of proprioceptive sensations
by discharging motor signals ∆ϕ via classic reflex arcs.
In the present simulation, the external hidden state ϑ is a point property, e.g.,
temperature or a salient visual feature, which varies with the field point x unless the
environment is in global thermal equilibrium. As the simplest environmental map, we
take hpϑ, aq “ ϑpxpaqq and assume that the sensory influx at the corresponding receptor
is given by
ϕ “ ϑ` zgp, (23)
where zgp is the random fluctuation. The external property, e.g., temperature, is
assumed to display a spatial profile as follows:
ϑpxq “ ϑ0{px2 ` 1q,
where ϑ0 is the value at the field origin, and the desired environmental niche is situated
at x “ xd, where ϑpxdq “ ϑd. The biological agent that senses temperature is allowed to
navigate through a one-dimensional environment by exploiting the hidden property. The
agent initiates its motion from xp0q, where the temperature does not accord with the
desired value. In this case, the agent must fulfill its allostasis at the cost of biochemical
energy by exploiting the environment according to
xptq “ xp0q `
ż t
0
apt1qdt1, (24)
where aptq is a motor variable, e.g., agent’s velocity. Accordingly, the nonstationary
sensory data ϕptq are afferent at the receptor with respect to the noise zgp. The
time dependence is caused by the agent’s own motion, i.e., ϕptq “ ϑpxpaptqqq, which
is assumed to be latent to the agent’s brain in the current model. With the prescribed
sensorimotor control, the rate of averaged sensory data with respect to the noise is
related to the control variable as follows:
9ϕ “ BϕpxqBx a.
As discussed in Sect. 3, the neural observer does not know how the sensory inputs
at the proprioceptor are affected by the agent’s motor reflex control. In the case of
saccadic motor control (Friston et al. 2012), an agent may as well stand at a field point
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Figure 1. Influx of stochastic sensory data ϕptq generated by the environmental
process Eq. (23), where we have set ϑ0 “ 20. The dashed curve represents the agent’s
position xptq as a function of time, with its movement starting from xp0q “ 10. The
dotted curve represents the magnitude of the latent motor variable aptq that controls
the agent’s location. [All curves are in arbitrary units.]
without changing its position but sampling the salient visual features of the environment
through a fast eye movement aptq, which makes the visual input nonstationary, i.e.,
ϕptq “ ϑpaptqq.
In Fig. 1, we depict the streams of sensory data at the agent’s receptor as a function
of time. For this simulation, the latent motor variable in Eq. (24) is taken as §
aptq “ ap0q e
t
p1` etq2 ,
which renders the agent’s position in the environment as xptq “ 2xp0q{p1 ` etq with
xp0q “ ´2ap0q. The figure shows that the agent, initially located at xp0q “ 10, senses
an undesirable stimulus ϑp0q .“ 0.2; accordingly, it reacts by using motor control to find
an acceptable ambient niche. After a period of ∆t “ 5, the agent finds itself at the
origin x “ 0, where the environmental state is marked by the value ϑ .“ 20.
Having prescribed the nonstationary sensory data, we now set up the Bayesian
mechanics to be integrated by applying Eqs. (17) and (18) to the generative models
below. We assume that the agent has already learned an optimal generative model;
therefore, the agent retains prior expectations about the observations and dynamics.
Here, for demonstrational purposes, we take the learned generative model in its simplest
linear form:
gpµq “ µ, (25)
fpµq “ ´pµ´ ϑdq. (26)
Note that the motor control a is not included in the generative model, and the desired
sensory data ϑd, e.g., temperature, appears as the brain’s prior belief about the hidden
§ For simplicity, we assume that this is hardwired in the agent’s reflex pathway over evolutionary and
developmental time scales.
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state. Accordingly, Eqs. (17) and (18) are reduced to a coupled set of differential
equations for the brain variable µ and its conjugate momentum p:
9µ “ ´ pµ´ ϑdq ` 1
mw
p` α∆ϕ, (27)
9p “ p1` βqp´ `1´ γ2˘∆ϕ. (28)
The parameters α, β, and γ are proportional to the correlation ρ; see Eq. (19). Hence,
they become zero when the neural response to the sensory inputs is uncorrelated with
the neural dynamics, which is not the case in general. The time-dependent driving
terms appearing on the RHS of both equations, namely Eqs. (27) and (28), include the
sensorimotor signal ∆ϕpµ;ϕptqq given in Eq. (20). The motor variable a, which drives
the nonstationary inputs ϕptq, is unknown to the neural observer in our implementation.
In the following, for a compact mathematical description, we denote the brain’s
perceptual state as a column vector:
Ψ ”
˜
µ
p
¸
.
The vector Ψ represents the brain’s current expectation µ and the associated prediction
error p with respect to the sensory causes, encoded by the neuronal activities performed
when encountering a sensory influx. Therefore, in terms of the perceptual vector Ψ,
Eqs. (27) and (27) are expressed as
dΨ
dt
`RΨ “ S, (29)
where the relaxation matrix R is defined as
R “
˜
1` φ
mw
´ 1
mw
´mz ` φ2mw ´p1` φmw q
¸
, (30)
and the source vector S encompassing the sensory influx ϕptq is defined as
S “
˜
ϑd ` φmwϕ
´pmz ´ φ2mz qϕ
¸
. (31)
Unless it is a pathological case, the steady-state (or equilibrium) solution ψeq of Eq. (29)
is uniquely obtained as
Ψeq “ R´1S ”
˜
µeq
peq
¸
. (32)
We find it informative to consider the general solution Ψptq of Eq. (29) with respect to
the fixed point ψeq by setting
ψptq ” Ψptq ´Ψeq.
To this end, we seek time-dependent solutions for the shifted measure ψptq as follows
dψ
dt
`Rψ “ δS,
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where δS “ Sptq ´ Sp8q. It is straightforward to integrate the above inhomogeneous
differential equation to obtain a formal solution, which is given by
ψptq “ e´Rtψp0q `
ż t
0
dt1e´Rpt´t
1qδSpt1q. (33)
Note that δS becomes zero identically for static sensory inputs; therefore, the relaxation
admits simple homogeneous dynamics. In contrast, for time-varying sensory inputs, the
inhomogeneous dynamics driven by the source term is expected to be predominant.
However, on time scales longer than the sensory-influx saturation time τ , it can be
shown that δS Ñ 0; for instance, τ .“ 5 in Fig. 1. Therefore, in such a time scale,
the inhomogeneous contribution in the relaxation diminishes even for time-varying
sensory inputs, and only the homogeneous contribution is dominant for further time-
development. The ensuing homogeneous relaxation can be expressed in terms of the
eigenvalues λl and eigenvectors ξ
plq of the relaxation matrix R as follows:
ψptq “
2ÿ
l“1
cle
´λltξplq, (34)
where the expansion coefficients cl are fixed by the initial conditions ψp0q. The initial
conditions ψp0q represent a spontaneous or resting cognitive state. In Eq. (34), the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors are determined by the secular equation
Rξplq “ λlξplq. (35)
Then, the solution for the linear RD Eq. (29) is given by
Ψptq “ Ψeq `
2ÿ
l“1
cle
´λltξplq, (36)
which is exact for perceptual inference, and legitimate for active inference on timescales
t ą τ .
Before presenting the numerical outcome, we first inspect the nature of the fixed
points by analyzing the eigenvalues of the relaxation matrix R given in Eq. (30). First,
it can be seen that the trace of R is zero, which indicates that the two eigenvalues have
opposite signs, i.e., λ1 “ ´λ2. Second, the determinant ofR can be calculated as follows
DetpRq “ ´ p1` φ{mwq ` 1
mw
`´mz ` φ2{mz˘ .
Therefore, if the correlation φÑ 0, it can be conjectured that both eigenvalues are real.
This is because DetpRq “ λ1λ2 Ñ ´1 ´mz{mw ă 0, which gives rise to λ21 “ λ22 ą 0
using the first conjecture. Thus, we can conclude that the two eigenvalues are real and
have opposite signs. Therefore, for φ “ 0, the solution will be unstable. In contrast,
when the correlation is retained, DetpRq can be positive for a suitable choice of statistical
parameters, namely mw, mz, and φ. In the latter case, the condition λ1λ2 ą 0 renders
λ2l ă 0 for both l “ 1, 2. Accordingly, λ1 and λ2 that have opposite signs are purely
imaginary, which makes the fixed point Ψeq a center (Strogatz 2015). If we define
λ1,2 ” ˘iω, the long-time solution of RD with respect to Ψeq is expressed as
ψptq “ c1eiωtξp1q ` c2e´iωtξp2q,
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Figure 2. Perceptual inference of static sensory data: (Left) Oscillatory brain
variables µ “ µptq developed from a common spontaneous state pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q
by responding to sensory inputs ϕ “ 10 (gray), 15 (red), and 20 (blue). Horizontal
dotted line indicates the agent’s prior belief about the sensory input. (Right) Limit
cycles in the perceptual state space from an input ϕ “ 4.0 for three initial conditions
pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q, p´20,´100q, and p´40,´200q. The common fixed point is
indicated by an orange bullet at the center of the orbits, which predicts the sensory
cause incorrectly. [All curves are in arbitrary units.]
which specifies a limit cycle with an angular frequency ω. Thus, according to our
formulation, the effect of correlation on the brain’s RD is not a subsidiary but a crucial
component. Here, we consider numerical illustrations with finite correlation.
We exploited a wide range of parameters for numerically solving Eqs. (27) and
(28) and found that there exists a narrow window in the statistical parameters σw,
σz, and φ, within which a stable trajectory is allowed for a successful inference. This
finding implies that the agent’s brain must learn and hardwire this narrow parameter
range over evolutionary and developmental timescales; namely, the generative models
are conditioned on an individual biological agent. We denote the instantaneous cognitive
state as pµptq, pptqq for notational convenience.
In Fig. 2, we present the numerical outcome from the perceptual inference of the
static sensory inputs. To obtain the results, we have chosen a particular set of statistical
parameters as follows:
σw “ 1.0, σz “ 10, and φ “ ´2.8,
which specify the neural inertial masses
mw
.“ 4.6 and mz “ 0.1ˆmw
as well as the coefficients that enter the RD, namely
α
.“ ´0.60, β “ ´0.28, and γ “ ´2.8.
In Fig. 2 (Left), we depict the brain variable µ as a function of time, which represents
the cognitive expectation of a registered sensory input, under the generative model
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Figure 3. Active perception: Time-development of the perceptual state inferring
the external causes of sensory inputs that are altered by the agent’s motor control.
The blue and magenta curves depict the brain activity µptq and the corresponding
momentum pptq, respectively, and the noisy curve indicates the nonstationary sensory
inputs ϕptq at the receptor. For numerical illustration, we have used σw “ 1.0, σz “
10, and φ “ ´2.8. [All curves are in arbitrary units.]
[Eq. (25)] for three values, namely ϕ “ 10, 15, and 20. For all illustrations, the agent’s
prior belief with regard to the sensory input is set to be
ϑd “ 20,
which is indicated by the horizontal dotted line. The blue curve represents the case in
which the sensory data are in line with the belief. The RD of the perceptual inference
delivers an exact output pµeq, peqq “ p20, 0q. Note that µeq and peq are the temporal
averages of µptq and pptq, respectively, in the stationary limit. The other two inferences
underscore the correct answer. Figure 2 (Right) corresponds to the case of a single
sensory data ϕ “ 4.0, which the standing agent senses at the field point x “ 2. The
ensuing trajectories from all three initial spontaneous states have their limit cycles in
the state space defined by µ and p. We numerically determined the fixed point to be
pµeq, peqq .“ p´65.6,´306q and the two eigenvalues of the relaxation matrix R to be
pλ1, λ2q .“ p1.84i,´1.84iq, which are purely imaginary and have opposite signs. Again,
the perceptual outcome does not accord with the sensory input; it deviates significantly.
Next, in Fig. 3, we present the results for active inference, which were calculated
using the same generative parameters used in Fig. 2. The agent is initially situated at
xp0q “ 2, where it senses the sensory influx ϑp0q “ 4, which does not match the desired
value ϑd “ 20. Therefore, the agent reacts to find a comfortable environmental niche
matching its prior belief, which generates nonstationary sensory inputs at the receptors
(see Fig. 1). It can be observed that the brain variable µ initially undergos a transient
period at t ď 5. The RD commences from the resting condition pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q
and then develops a stationary evolution. We have also numerically confirmed that the
brain’s stationary prediction µeq, which is the brain’s perceptual outcome of the sensory
cause, is close to but not in line with the prior belief ϑd. The stationary value peq is
estimated to be approximately 8.0, which is the average of the stationary oscillation of
the prediction error pptq.
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Figure 4. Active inference: Temporal development of trajectories rendering stationary
limit cycles in the perceptual phase space, obtained from the same statistical
parameters used in Fig. 2. The blue, red, and gray curves correspond to the three
initial conditions, pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q, p0, 100q, and p35, 0q, respectively. The angular
frequency of the limit cycles is the magnitude of the imaginary eigenvalues of the
relaxation matrix R given in Eq. (30). The common fixed point is indicated by a
magenta bullet at the center of the orbits. [All curves are in arbitrary units.]
In Fig. 4, the trajectory corresponding to that in Fig. 3 is illustrated in blue color in
the perceptual state space spanned by µ and p, including two other time developments
from different choices of initial conditions. All data were calculated using the same
generative parameters and sensory inputs used for Fig. 3. Regardless of the initial
conditions, after each transient period, the trajectories approach stationary limit cycles
about a common fixed point, as seen in the case of static sensory inputs in Fig. 2(b).
The fixed point Ψeq and stationary frequency ω of the limit cycles are not affected by
the initial conditions, which are solely determined by the generative parameters mw,
mz, and φ and the prior belief ϑd for a given sensory input ϕ [see Eqs. (32) and (35)].
In addition, we have numerically observed that the precise location of the fixed points
is stochastic, reflecting the noise from the nonstationary sensory influx ϕ.
In the framework of active inference, motor behavior is attributed to the inference of
the causes of proprioceptive sensations (Adams et al. 2013), and in turn, the prediction
errors convey the motor signals in the closed-loop dynamics of perception and motor
control. In Fig. 5, we depict the sensorimotor signals ∆ϕpµ;ϕptqq that appear as time-
dependent driving terms in Eqs. (27) and (28). In both figures, the agent is assumed
to be initially situated in such a way as to sense the sensory data ϕp0q “ 4. After an
initial transient period elapses, the motor signals exhibit a stationary oscillation about
average zero in Fig. 5 (Left), implying the successful fulfillment of the active inference of
nonstationary sensory influx matching the desired belief ϑd “ 20. The amplitude of the
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Figure 5. Motor signals ∆ϕpµ;ϕptqq evoked by the discrepancy between the
nonstationary sensory stream and its top-down prediction [see Eq. (20)]. Here, we set
the prior belief ϑd “ 20 (Left) and ϑd “ 10 (Right). The blue and red curves represent
the results from the initial condition pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q and p0, 100q, respectively.
The gray curves represent the corresponding signals from the plain perception of the
static sensory input. All data were obtained by setting the statistical parameters as
σw “ 1.0, σz “ 10, and φ “ ´2.8. [All curves are in arbitrary units.]
motor signal shown by the blue curve is smaller than that shown by the red curve, which
is also reflected in the size of the corresponding limit cycles in Fig. 4. The prediction-
error signal from the plain perception also exhibits an oscillatory feature in the gray
curve, which arises from the stationary time dependence of the brain variable µptq. The
amplitude shows a large variation due to the significant discrepancy between the static
sensory input ϕ “ 4 and its prior belief ϑd “ 20. In Fig. 5 (Right), for comparison,
we have repeated the calculation with another value: ϑd “ 10. In this case, the prior
belief ϑd about the sensory input does not accord with the stationary sensory streams.
Therefore, the blue and red signals for active inference oscillate about the negatively
shifted values from average zero. In contrast to Fig. 5 (Left), the error-signal amplitude
of the static input is reduced because the difference between the sensory data and the
prior belief decreases.
Next, we consider the role of correlation φ in the brain’s RD, whose value is
limited by the constraint |φ| ď ?σwσz. To this end, we chose three values of φ for
the fixed variances σw and σz, and integrated the RD for active inference. In Fig. 6,
we present the resulting time evolution of the brain states µ for the initial condition
pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q. In this figure, the conjugate momentum variables are not shown.
The noticeable features in the results include the changes in the fixed point and the
amplitude of the stationary oscillation with correlation. The average value of µptq in
the periodic oscillation corresponds to the perceptual outcome µeq of the sensory data
in the stationary limit. We remark that for all numerical data presented in this work,
we have chosen only negative values for φ. This choice was made because our numerical
inspection revealed that positive correlation does not yield stable solutions.
As the final numerical manifestation, in Fig. 7, we show the temporal buildup of the
limit cycles in the perceptual phase space; however, this time, we fix σw while varying
σz and φ. The resulting fixed points are located approximately at the center of each
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Figure 6. Time evolution of the brain variable µ. Here, we vary the correlation φ
for fixed variances σw “ 1.0 and σz “ 10. The red, blue, and gray curves correspond
to φ “ ´3.0, ´2.8, and ´2.6, respectively. For all data, the agent is environmentally
situated at x “ 2, where it senses the transient sensory inputs ϕptq induced by the
motor reflexes at the proprioceptive level. The agent’s initial cognitive state is assumed
to be pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q, and the prior belief is set as ϑd “ 20. [All curves are in
arbitrary units.]
limit cycle, which are not shown. Similar to that in Fig. 6, it can be observed that the
positions of the fixed point and the amplitudes of oscillation are altered by the variation
in the statistical parameters. Evidently, a different set of parameters, namely σw, σz,
and φ, which are the learning parameters encoded by the brain, result in a distinctive
Bayesian mechanics of active inference.
Here, we summarize the major findings from the application of our formulation to
the simple nonstationary model. The brain’s Bayesian mechanics, i.e., Eqs. (27) and
(28), employ the linear generative models given in Eqs. (25) and (26).
(i) The steady-state solutions of the RD turn out to be a center about which stationary
limit cycles (periodic oscillations) are formed in the perceptual phase space, which
constitute the brain’s nonequilibrium resting states.
(ii) The nonequilibrium stationarity stems from the pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues
of the relaxation matrix with opposite signs, given by Eq. (30); the magnitude
specifies the angular frequency of the periodic trajectory.
(iii) The centers are determined by the generative parameters and the prior belief for a
given sensory input in the steady limit [see Eq. (32)], which represents the outcome
of active inference and the entailed prediction error.
(iv) The inclusion of noise correlation between the brain’s expectation of the external
dynamics and sensory generation is consequential to ensuring a stable solution.
Furthermore, based on numerical experience, a negative correlation is a prerequisite
for obtaining stable solutions using the current model.
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Figure 7. Limit cycles in the perceptual phase space. Here, we have considered several
sets of σz and φ for a fixed σw “ 1.0. The red, blue, and gray curves were obtained
from pσz , φq “ p50,´6.6q, p10,´2.8q, and p100,´9.5q, respectively. For all data, the
agent’s initial cognitive state is assumed to be pµp0q, pp0qq “ p0, 0q, and the prior belief
is set as ϑd “ 20. The agent is environmentally situated at x “ 2, where it senses the
transient sensory inputs ϕptq induced by the motor reflexes at the proprioceptive level.
[All curves are in arbitrary units.]
5. Concluding remarks
We implemented the FEP with the minimization scheme derived from the principle of
least action to cast the promising unified biological framework to a more physically
grounded approach. It should be noted that in our theory, the continuous time-integral
of the induced IFE in the brain, not an instantaneous IFE, performs as a variational
objective function over a finite temporal horizon. To present the novel aspects of our
formulation as well as a manifestation of its utility with a concrete model, this study
focused on the perceptual inference of nonstationary sensory influx at the interface. The
nonstationary sensory inputs were assumed to be unknown or contingent to the neural
observer without explicitly engaging in motor-inference dynamics in the RD; in other
words, the agent’s sensorimotor selection was not part of our internal model. Instead, we
considered that the motor signals are triggered by the discrepancies between the sensory
inputs at the proprioceptive level and their top-down predictions. They appeared as
nonautonomous source terms in the derived RD, thus completing the sensorimotor
dynamics via reflex arcs or oculomotor dynamics of sampling visual stimuli. This closed-
loop dynamics contrasts with the gradient-descent implementation, which involves the
double optimization of the top-down belief propagation as well as the motor inference
in the message-passing algorithms.
Using the parsimonious agent-based model, we evinced that the ensuing trajectories
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and fixed points in the perceptual state space are affected by the input values of the
learning parameters and the hardwired prior belief. The solutions were obtained by
integrating the Bayesian equations of motion for a given default state, and they were
found to be the outcome of the brain’s perceptual inference of the causes of sensory
stimuli. In theoretical neurosciences, it is commonly recognized that neural system
dynamics implement cognitive processes that influence psychiatric states (Durstewitz et
al. 2020). However, we did not attempt to explicate the effect of neural inertial masses
(precisions) and correlation on the generative processes of the numerically observed
limit cycles. This was because of the numerical limitation set by the presented model,
which permits stable solutions in a very narrow window of statistical parameters. We
hope that the key features of our manifestation will serve to motivate and guide further
investigations on more realistic generative models with neurobiological implications.
Finally, we mention the recent research efforts on synthesizing perception, motor
control, and decision-making within the FEP (Friston et al. 2015; Friston et al. 2017;
Biel et al. 2018; Parr and Friston 2019; van de Laar and de Vries 2019; Isomura and
Friston 2019; Tschantz et al. 2020; Da Costa et al. 2020). The underlying idea of
these studies is rooted in machine learning, and they attempt to widen the scope of
active inference by incorporating prior beliefs about behavioral policies. The new trend
generalizes the instantaneous IFE Ft given in Eq. (8) to the future expected FE (EFE) in
a time series and formulates the adaptive decision-making processes in action-oriented
models. The EFE or generalized FE essentially appears to be a discrete sum of the
informational action S in the cumulative time steps, i.e., S « řt Ft [see Eq. (12)], while
encapsulating motor planning or policies as priors in the framework of Markov decision
processes. The assimilation of this feature needs to be studied in depth (Millidge et
al. 2020). Moreover, an inferential mechanism of motor planning for active perception
can be included in the continuous-time formulation as a part of the generative models
(Bogacz 2020). We are currently considering a formulation of motor planning together
with the assimilation of extended IFEs in the scope of the least action principle.
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